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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers usually practice in law partnerships, and regularly, and
with increasing frequency, join and depart these law firms. Commen-
tators have only recently begun to examine the law governing the de-
parture of partners from law firms.' The purpose of this Comment is
to examine one small aspect of the law governing this mobility: the
post-departure liability of departed lawyers for malpractice committed
by the remaining, servicing (to the client), ex-partners. The discussion
will demonstrate how a too rigorous application of partnership law to
the law firm situation leads to bad law. The Comment will suggest
that the client-law firm retainer agreement, which of course commits
the firm to provide each of its clients appropriate legal services, also
presumptively authorizes the law firm to manage its personnel for all
* Margaret R. Larson Professor of Legal Ethics, University of Nebraska. BA., J.D.,
LL.M., Harvard University.
1. See Jensen, Partners at Peril, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 23, 1990 at 1, col. 3.
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its clients' best interests. The Comment will further suggest that any
understanding among the departed lawyer and her ex-colleagues with
respect to the firm and all its clients' best interests should normally
result in the departed lawyer's discharge from liability for her ex-col-
leagues' post-departure malpractice. This should protect all interests
without placing excessive and unnecessary burdens on large law
firms.2
Part II will briefly illustrate the problem. Part III will discuss im-
portant precedent establishing that the departed lawyer remains lia-
ble for the post-departure malpractice of her ex-colleagues. Part IV
demonstrates how this result, which is a surprise to many commenta-
tors, is poor policy (section A), unfair to the departed lawyer (section
B), and inconsistent with client expectations (section C). Part V
builds on Professor Hillman's recommended solution to satisfy all in-
terests. Part VI briefly summarizes.
II. THE PROBLEM
On Day 1, Client A retained Lawyer A and his firm, A, B & Z, in a
legal matter. On Day 2, Lawyer Z, one of the firm's partners, departed
firm A, B & Z. Lawyer A and firm A & B continued to represent
Client A. Under a first scenario, Client A had no expectations whatso-
ever with respect to Lawyer Z. Under a second scenario, Client A ex-
pected Lawyer Z to represent him or to attend to some aspect of his
case. This expectation would have been explicit in the client-law firm
agreement or implied from the client-firm relationship.
On Day 975, Lawyer A or some other lawyer in firm A & B en-
gaged in an act or omission which constituted legal malpractice and
which damaged Client A.3 Is Lawyer Z liable under either scenario?
III. THE LAW
The leading case is Redman v. Walters.4 Redman retained attor-
2. This Comment will not examine more far-reaching reforms, such as a revision of
the Uniform Partnership Act, which might give greater entity status to the part-
nership organization as discussed in UPA Revision Subcommittee on Partner-
ships and Unincorporated Business Orgs., Should the Uniform Partnership Act
Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121 (1987); Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner
Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 357 (1987).
3. This Comment focuses explicitly on malpractice committed after the departed
lawyer has left the firm.
4. 88 Cal. App. 3d 448, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1979).
The principle was followed more recently in Palomba v. Barish. 626 F. Supp.
722 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Clients retained Lawyer Barish of the Adler-Barish law firm.
Lawyer Daniels then withdrew from the firm. Two years later Lawyer Barish
purportedly committed malpractice. The court reasoned as follows:
a. The clients' contract was unfinished business.
b. The Adler-Barish firm remains in existence for the purpose of completing
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ney Brunsell and the law firm of MacDonald, Brunsell & Walters to
commence and maintain a law suit. Shortly thereafter, Walters, who
had "never met" client Redman, was not "aware he existed," and had
"[n]ever discussed or in any way participated in any review of the [sub-
ject] legal services," departed the law firm.5 Attorney Brunsell con-
tinued to represent client Redman. Five years later Redman's suit
was dismissed; Brunsell had allegedly committed malpractice by fail-
ing to bring the suit to trial within the requisite time. The California
Court of Appeal imposed liability on the departed lawyer Walters.
This will be referred to as the Redman principle. The court rigorously
reasoned as follows:
a. The court based its reasoning on state partnership law.
Although Walters' departure caused the dissolution of the MacDon-
ald, Brunsell & Walters law firm, it did not terminate the firm's exist-
ence. The firm remained in existence to complete its contractual
obligations. Final termination would only occur when the firm had
completed this winding up.6
b. The court observed that MacDonald, Brunsell & Walters was
committed to complete the unfinished business related to the Redman
case. This commitment was a firm liability.7
c. Since "'MacDonald, Brunsell & Walters' continued as a part-
nership and Walters as a partner," it followed that Walters' "liability
in such a case [would] not be terminated except by performance of the
agreement creating the liability" or by an explicit discharge from such
liability by Redman.8
its unfinished obligations. "The dissolution of a partnership will not relieve an
individual partner of a duty under a contract entered into before the partnership
was dissolved." Id. at 725.
c. Each partner of the dissolved firm remains liable for the negligent acts of
his partners. "[Tihe fact that Daniels' withdrawal from Adler-Barish two years
prior to the purported negligent act is of little moment to whether or not Daniels
can be held liable for the malpractice of his former partners." Id See also Black-
mon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970).
Not all cases follow the Redman principle. E.g., Gibson v. Talley, 156 Ga. App.
593, 275 S.E.2d 154 (1980); Collins v. Levine, 156 Ga. App. 502, 274 S.E.2d 841
(1980). Both these Georgia cases, however, might have depended on a peculiar
wrinkle in the Georgia partnership law as discussed in Ribstein, Smith, & Car-
ssow, The Uniform Partnership Act as Adopted in Georgia, 21 GA. ST. B.J. 56
(1984); Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36 MERCER L.
REV. 443 (1985). But see Burnside v. McCrary, 384 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
5. Redman v. Walters, 80 Cal. App. 3d 448, 451, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 43 (1979). More-
over, he never had a "communication of any nature from... [nor] participated in
nor received any compensation whatsoever for any services purportedly rendered
on behalf of Fred Redman." Id.





The Redman court's assumption in this line of logic was that the
law firm's commitment to a client is a "liability" which dissolution
does not, ipso facto, discharge. This assumption is not self-evident.
Obviously, this unfinished business is different in important respects
from a typical financial liability. A debt only requires a money pay-
ment; a law firm's unfinished commitment requires the rendering of
professional services. The financial creditor may be primarily con-
cerned with the financial solvency of the partners, while the law
firm's client will be more directly concerned with the partners' profes-
sional capabilities. Finally, most financial liabilities can be wound up
in a reasonably short period of time; the unfinished business of a con-
tingent fee lawsuit can take years.
Regardless, once the Redman court deemed the client-law firm
agreement as a liability, the court believed that a logical application of
partnership law in the situation required that the departed partner
could not be released from liability without an explicit client dis-
charge. In lieu of this discharge each partner of the dissolved firm
remained jointly and severally liable for his colleagues' malpractice.
IV. BAD LAW
In light of this authority, it is surprising that most lawyers, and at
least one prominent commentator, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., be-
lieve that the departed lawyer has no financial liability for post-depar-
ture malpractice. At most, they assert, the departed lawyer owes the
client the continuing obligations of confidentiality and limited loy-
alty.9 As Hazard has written: "In the absence of any indications to the
contrary, an exiting lawyer can assume the need to be concerned only
for his or her clients, that is, assume that the remaining lawyers will
take care of the clients they served."10 Hazard's confident assump-
tions reflect sound policy; judicial application of the Redman principle
is poor policy, is unfair and is not consistent, in most circumstances,
with client expectations.
A. Policy Considerations
It is a principle of vicarious liability, inherent in partnership law,
that the law firm and each partner may be jointly and severally liable
for the malpractice of each firm lawyer. This principle encourages
partners to monitor and, where appropriate, control the professional
behavior of their colleagues. This is an important aspect of law firm
9. See Hazard, Ethical Considerations in Withdrawal, E pulsion and Retirement,
in SECTION OF ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE, AM. BAR Ass'N, WITHDRAWAL RE-
TIREMENT AND DISPUTES: WHAT You AND YOUR FIRM NEED To KNOw, 32, 37
(1986).
10. Id. at 35.
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cooperation. Not only will partner to partner assistance not be per-
ceived as unwarranted interference with the lawyer providing the
services, but also the sharing of information among firm lawyers will
not be a violation of client confidentiality. The Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct reflect
these collegial and cooperative premises.
The Redmarn principle applies this concept of vicarious liability to
the departed lawyer during the winding up period. This application
does not serve the goal of effective monitoring. First, the departed
lawyer will not be able to control the servicing lawyer. In providing
professional services to a client, the servicing lawyer must remain in-
dependent from outside influences. Any effort by the departed lawyer
to control the professional service of her ex-colleague(s), which the
Redman principle encourages, would constitute unwarranted inter-
ference with the servicing lawyer's independence. Second, the de-
parted lawyer will not be able to monitor the servicing lawyer's
activities. Information relating to the servicing lawyer's client will be
confidential vis-a-vis anyone, including a lawyer, who is not a firm
member at that time. The departed lawyer will, therefore, not be able
to discover sufficient facts to make a judgment about whether the
servicing lawyer is providing competent service. The Redman princi-
ple unwisely encourages the departed lawyer to be an unprofessional
snoop.
Another important aspect of vicarious liability is that it encourages
each partner to choose her colleagues with care. If all firm members
may be liable for each other's malpractice, it behooves them to choose
their colleagues carefully. Among other things, this provides an en-
dorsement to future clients that the firm, and all its members, are
competent. Arguably, the Redman principle achieves the same end.
If a lawyer knows that she may be vicariously liable for her colleagues'
malpractice both when they are in practice together and after she de-
parts, she will have an additional reason for initially choosing her col-
leagues with particular care.
This argument, however, is strained. First, the Redman principle
only adds marginally to the liability risk and is therefore unlikely to
encourage additional caution in initial choice situations. Second, the
principle may actually discourage appropriate disclaimers (e.g., the
opposite of an endorsement) of lawyer competence. A competent
partner may believe that her colleagues are no longer able practition-
ers. In an effort to minimize her liability, she may wish to depart the
firm. Her departure might serve as a public suggestion of their
incompetence.
If the Redman principle applies, however, she will remain liable
for the unfinished business of the dissolved firm. Since, as a departed
partner, she will not be able to monitor her ex-colleagues, she may be
1991]
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reluctant to withdraw and to leave her colleagues to their own incom-
petent devices. In these circumstances, there would be no helpful
warning, and future clients might be jeopardized.
B. Fairness
A law firms may, of course, profit from its agent's activities. It
therefore seems appropriate that the firm, in the first instance, should
bear the costs of its agent's negligence committed in the scope of the
agent's employment. This is the enterprise theory of vicarious liabil-
ity. It satisfies a rough concept of justice. The firm that stands to gain
by the activity will bear the cost of the activity.
This principle does not work well for partners in a dissolved, but
not terminated, law firm."1 The departed lawyer remains a member
of the dissolved firm for the purpose of winding up the firm's unfin-
ished business. The firm's unfinished business is an asset of the dis-
solved firm, and the lawyer who winds up the business, for example,
the servicing lawyer, is not entitled to any special remuneration for
his work.12 If the departed lawyer were a twenty percent partner of
the firm while with the firm, she would be entitled to a twenty per-
cent share of any fee generated by the unfinished business.13 Since,
therefore, the departed partner may gain from the completion of un-
finished work, it is arguably fair, as the Redman principle maintains,
to hold her, as a member of the dissolved firm, liable for the post-
departure malpractice of its agents (her ex-colleagues).
The usual facts of law firm dissolutions undermine this analysis.
In most law firm dissolutions, the firm members will agree who will
wind up, that is, service, which client's cases. They will often explic-
11. This enterprise theory may not even work well in an existing law partnership
arrangement. In the law firm situation, for example, the partners will probably
have agreed to a disproportionate profit division. For example, the law firm may
give one of two partners a 20% interest in all profits generated by the firm. His
liability for a colleague's malpractice (after the firm's assets are reached and the
plaintiff determines to sue him) may ultimately be for 100% of the damages. If
this were the case, there would be little parity between profits and potential
losses, and the basic principle that the person who stands to gain ought to bear
the loss would be undermined.
12. R. HILLmAN, LAW FiRM BREAKUPS, 78 n.2; Comment, Barefoot Shoemakers: An
Uncompromising Approach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law
Firms Split Up, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 509 (1987); Comment, Winding Up Dissolved
Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CALiF. L.
REV. 1597 (1985).
13. This is, concededly, a controversial application of partnership law to law firms.
For the purposes of this Comment, however, it will be accepted. Since it applies
to clients the departing lawyer takes with her, it discourages the grabbing of cli-
ents. Moreover, it encourages the trusting assignment of work within the firm
and discourages partners positioning themselves to take clients with them in the
event the firm dissolves.
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itly agree among themselves that the lawyer who does service the cli-
ent will be entitled to the fee generated by the unfinished business.
Although no lawyer may force himself on a client, these intralawyer
decisions as to fee allocation may be made without client participation.
Clients who remain with the law firm, either after deliberate deci-
sion or by inertia, will continue their original fee arrangement with
the firm; they will probably be unaware of the fact that the departed
lawyer will often get zero percent rather than twenty percent of the
fee (pursuant to an intra-lawyer agreement which will give the de-
parted lawyer one hundred percent of the fees on client cases which
she took with her). The end result is that there will usually be no
match between the departed lawyer's expected gain from unfinished
business (zero percent) and her potential Redman liability on this un-
finished business (one hundred percent).
Of course, one answer to this concern is to claim that the departed
lawyer, if she were held one hundred percent liable for the malprac-
tice of her former colleagues, should have some form of indemnifica-
tion against the servicing lawyers who committed the malpractice.
Principles of partnership law as well as general equity principles sup-
port this claim.14
There are, however, several reasons to suspect that the departed
lawyer would be denied this reimbursement. Although nonclients are
frequently permitted to sue lawyers for negligence, courts may be re-
luctant to permit these suits if the servicing lawyer's loyalty to his
client will be jeopardized. This could be the situation if the departed
lawyer were permitted indemnification. If the departed lawyer's ex-
colleagues could be held liable to the departed lawyer for malpractice
committed while servicing a client, the servicing lawyer might com-
promise his duty to his client for fear of his own liability to a nonclient
(i.e., the departed lawyer).' 5
Second, the courts are often reluctant to permit lawyers to sue
each other. The public should have confidence in the legal system and
its professional participants. Without this confidence, persons might
try and resolve disputes in other less desirable ways. Litigation among
14. The UPA supports this notion. It states that if a lawyer is required to pay more
than his proportionate contribution, he has the right to contributions from the
remaining partners. This seems fair in that not only were the remaining partners
at fault, but they, under this described scenario, stood to gain.
15. This is not to suggest that nonclients will never be able to sue a lawyer for his
negligence. The courts have breached the citadel of privity in the legal profession
as well as in other domains. The courts, however, have expressed some reluc-
tance to permit lawyers to sue each other. Apparently, the nonclient-lawyer is
not only a less sympathetic figure, but she is also a potentially more litigious ac-




lawyers could easily inhibit this public confidence.16
C. Client Expectations
The Redman principle does not support normal client expecta-
tions. Clients, of course, expect different things from different firms.
This Comment, however, suggests that the usual client expectations
include two elements. The client expects that the lawyers assigned to
his case, for example, the servicing lawyers, will provide the appropri-
ate legal services. This is a commonly accepted obligation. The client
also expects that the firm's partners will manage the firm's personnel
in order to advance his and other clients' interests. In order to do this,
the firm must make work assignments carefully among all relevant
firm members.
Commentators rarely focus on this management obligation, but it
is inherent in the fact that it is a firm, rather than an individual law-
yer, which provides the legal services. It is inconceivable that clients
could expect anything else. They are aware that lawyers are fre-
quently busy; that they charge at variable rates; that sometimes work
can be done more efficiently by a different status lawyer; that law has
become more specialized; and that particular jobs can be more fruit-
fully examined by particular specialist. It is this coordinated coopera-
tion which supports the principle that lawyers are presumptively
authorized to share confidences with firm colleagues.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct most clearly reflect this
emphasis on the firm's management function. Rule 5.1 is entitled
"Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer," and it clearly
mandates that a firm shall be responsible for assuring that all its
members conform to the rules. In other words, the firm must manage
its personnel in such a way that each servicing lawyer acts compe-
tently, diligently, and in accord with the rules of ethics. Civil lability
also reflects this management obligation, and courts have held super-
visory lawyers responsible for the negligence of their subordinates.
In sum, the client normally does not expect any particular lawyer
to provide his legal services. He expects the firm to assign appropriate
lawyers to do the work. Although he may anticipate that the firm will
financially stand behind its members' professional work, it is unlikely
that the client would expect a departed lawyer to guarantee his ex-
colleagues professional work. Judicial application of the Redman
principle is a windfall to the normal client. Of course, in some circum-
stances, the client has the legitimate right to expect that the firm will
manage his case in a particular way. This may be made clear in an
agreement. The client may insist that a particular senior partner liti-
16. & MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, 392 (1977); Comment, Liability
Among Attorneys in Legal Malpractice Actions, 34 S.C.L. REV. 733 (1983).
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gate his case or that a certain level of associate write his brief. This
understanding may also be implicit. For example, if client A retained
a particular law firm because lawyer X was its chief litigator, and if
the client communicated directly with lawyer X about his case, then a
court could find that there was an implicit agreement that the firm
must assign Lawyer X to client A's case. It is only in these second
scenario circumstances that the Redman principle makes sense.
V. SOLUTION
The Redman principle holds that the firm's unfinished business is
a firm liability. As such, the court held that the departed partner
could only be released from liability if the client knew of the firm
dissolution and discharged the lawyer. In Redman the court held that
the client did not have knowledge of the departure and dissolution,
that there had been no discharge, and that, therefore, the departed
lawyer remained liable.
Professor Hillman, one of the leading commentators on this issue,
has interpreted Redman to mean that in all circumstances the firm
must give notice of the departure of any partner to all the firm's cli-
ents if the client is to have the opportunity to discharge the departed
lawyer from this liability. He enthusiastically seizes this principle as
an opportunity to encourage lawyers to communicate with clients dur-
ing dissolution. He believes that notice helps clients, and he is critical
of those courts which perceive client notification in these circum-
stances as an unwarranted solicitation of business or the inappropriate
first step in the misappropriation of a firm asset.17 HilIman states that
the notice requirement forces the client to make an "informed, une-
quivocal" choice with respect to who-the departed lawyer, the firm,
or a different lawyer-will represent him in the future. This choice
would convert "cases from the status of winding-up business to that of
new business."' 8 He argues that this result would not only release the
departed lawyer from any liability, but would also assure that future
income would be allocated to the client's "new" lawyer.19
Although Professor Hillman's conclusion makes sense in those in-
stances in which the client expected the particular departed partner to
represent him or to attend to an aspect of his case, as in the second
scenario referred to in Part H, Professor Hillman recognizes that to
give all clients notice of each partner's departure would, in the case of
a large law firm, be an "expensive and excessive response to the threat
17. The court in Vollgraff v. Block, 117 Misc. 2d 489, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982), required that, at the very least, lawyers must notify clients of firm dissolu-
tions. Professor Hillman called the opinion enlightened. R. HILLMAN, supra note
12, at 108 n.34.
18. Id. at 107.
19. Id, at 106-10.
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of vicarious winding-up liability."20 This is certainly true when the
client has no expectations whatsoever with respect to the particular
departed lawyer, as in the first scenario in Part II.
This Comment suggests that since the client expects the firm to
manage its personnel in all the clients' best interests, courts should
hold, in first scenario situations, that the client has presumptively au-
thorized firm partners to discharge departed lawyers from any contin-
uing civil liability for her ex-colleagues' post-departure malpractice.2 '
Unless there is some indication otherwise, any intralawyer under-
standing with respect to the dissolution should, ipsofacto, act as such a
discharge.22
The departure of a partner is tantamount to a personnel adjust-
ment. The firm lawyers who remain to service the client routinely
manage the firm's personnel for all the clients' best interests. The
goal is coordinated cooperation. Judicial application of the Redman
principle encourages the departed lawyer to monitor and to attempt to
regulate the servicing lawyer's practice; this might result, at best, in
uncoordinated cooperation, and, at worst, unprofessional interference.
In order to avoid these problems, the courts should presume that the
servicing lawyers are authorized to discharge, and in fact, do routinely
discharge the departed lawyer from Redman type liability.
The Redman court wrote that "[h]ere, the unilateral decision of
the partnership to dissolve, and continue the representation of
Redman by two of its members, was patently not within the authority
granted it by Redman."23 This statement misconceives the client-law
firm agreement. Its focus is myopically on the firm's agreement to
provide legal services, and therefore, dissolution is irrelevant to this
agreement. If, as is suggested here, the courts would recognize the
management obligation as an important element of the agreement,
then the firm would have presumptive authority to manage reassign-
ments, departures, and even hirings as appropriate firm activities.
It is, of course, arguable that even if the remaining lawyers have
the authority to discharge the departed lawyer, they should not do so
unless they determine that it is in each individual client's best interest.
It would be impossible, however, to meet this standard. Each client
20. Id. at 109 n.36.
21. Of course, the presumption would not apply in second scenario situations. In
those cases, the client and the firm have either explicitly or implicitly agreed that
a particular lawyer(s) will attend to the case. In those circumstances, the firm
would not be authorized to discharge that lawyer from liability without an ex-
press discharge by the client.
22. However, one commentator has suggested that "[n]o coherent theory seems likely
to explain the results of all cases that have raised the question of the scope of a
lawyer's authority to act for a client. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmCs, 150
(1986).
23. Redman v. Walters, 88 Cal. App. 3d 448, 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 45 (1979).
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would, of course, want as many persons as possible liable for any mal-
practice. The presumed authorization must be for the firm to manage
its personnel in all its clients' best interests. Of course, each client
would want the best lawyer working on his case, but no one seriously
argues that the firn cannot make reasonable assignments to serve all
clients' interests. The case of the departed lawyer is analogous. It is
tantamount to a personnel decision, and therefore, if there has been
an intralawyer agreement as to what is best for the firm and the cli-
ents in the aggregate, this should discharge the departed lawyer from
liability with respect to any particular client.
Of course, this presumptive authority may be exercised negli-
gently. In such cases, all firm partners at the time of the negligence
should be vicariously liable for the resultant damages. The most obvi-
ous instance of such malpractice is firm abandonment of the client. In
Vollgraff v. Block,2 4 the client retained the law firm of Hull, Block
and Grundfast. Grundfast withdrew and the firm dissolved. The cli-
ent subsequently brought a malpractice action, alleging that the com-
plaint had not been filed in a timely manner. No one in the firm had
given the client notice that the firm was dissolving, and no lawyer con-
tinued to represent the client. In other words, the firm, and all its
members, simply abandoned the client. Under these circumstances,
the New York Supreme Court held each partner, including Grundfast,
liable for the resultant damages.
Most commentators have focused on the court's language sug-
gesting that it was the firm's failure to give notice to the client that
was the gravamen of the case. One commentator criticized the court
for suggesting that "a law partnership can terminate its fiduciary obli-
gation to clients by notifying them of the partnership's dissolution."25 .
Professor Hillman, on the other hand, stated that the opinion was en-
lightened.2 6 Both commentators, however, unduly focused on the is-
sue of notice. A better interpretation of the court's opinion is the
simple one that the firm managed its personnel negligently. The
firm's failure to notify the client of the dissolution was only one aspect
of this negligence. The court's last paragraph states:
In the case at bar, there is no indication that plaintiffs were notified of the
partnership's dissolution and that the dissolved partnership could no longer
represent plaintiffs in their personal injury action. Nor is there any proof of
retainer between plaintiffs and a former member of the firm. Under these
circumstances, the Court holds that mere dissolution of the defendants's law
partnership was ineffective to terminate the partners' obligations as attorneys
24. 117 Misc. 2d 489, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
25. Comment, Dissolution of a Law Partnership: Effect on Representation of the
Firm's Clients, 9 J. LEGAL PROF. 189, 191 (1984).
26. R. HILMAN, supra note 12, at 108 n.34.
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toward partnership clients.2 7
This Comment suggests that the key to the case was the firm's fail-
ure to meet its management obligation. If client Vollgraff did not le-
gitimately expect that Grundfast would attend to his case, and if the
remaining, servicing lawyer had competently continued to represent
him, then there would have been no breach of the firm's management
obligation, and the court should have found Grundfast discharged
from any post-departure liability.
The right of an attorney to withdraw from a case presents an help-
ful parallel. The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility suggest that a lawyer must withdraw from representation if she
cannot cooperate with her co-counsel.2 8 This is an analogous situation
to the departure of a firm's partner. Both Codes, however, insist that
the terminating lawyer "take steps to the extent reasonably practica-
ble to protect a client's interests"29 or takes "reasonable steps to avoid
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client."30 What is of impor-
tance here is the emphasis on reasonableness and the suggestion,
made explicit in the Model Rules, that giving reasonable notice to the
client is merely one way, but not an absolutely necessary way, of as-
suring that the client's interests will be protected.
VI. SUMMARY
This Comment has focused on an obscure area of law. It has ex-
amined the implications of the Redman case. It has suggested that the
unduly rigorous application of partnership law resulted in bad law. It
has endorsed Professor Hillman's suggestion that when a client re-
tains a firm with either an explicit or implicit expectation that a par-
ticular lawyer will attend to his interests, then that lawyer should
remain liable for post-departure malpractice unless the client is noti-
fied of her departure and discharges her from any continuing respon-
sibility. It is, however, unnecessary and impracticable for a law firm
to notify all clients of each lawyer's departure merely to assure that
the departed lawyer will not be responsible for her ex-colleagues'
post-departure negligence. This Comment has suggested that since
the client-law firm retainer agreement implicitly incorporates a firm's
obligation to manage its personnel, the agreement presumptively au-
thorizes the firm's lawyers to discharge departed lawyers in the rou-
tine first scenario situations. Any intrafirm agreement with respect to
the dissolution which considers the firm's and all its clients' best inter-
ests should, ipso facto, act as such a discharge.
27. Vollgraff v. Block, 117 Misc. 2d 489, 493, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 440 (1990)(emphasis
added).
28. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(3)(1969).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.16(d)(1983).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 2-110(A)(2)(1969).
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